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Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Civil No. 
11359 
~n,ATKMENT OF 'rHE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This artion was commenced by plaintiff bank to 
rrrover from its customer the amount of an overdraft 
<'rf'ated hy a charge-back of a foreign check which waa 
i'Pnt for collection but returned unpaid by the payor 
bank. with a counterclaim by the customer growing out 
of a prior transaction. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COFR'r 
After trial before Honorable Lewi a ,Jones, District 
.Judge, sitting with a jury, special interrogatories were 
returned with findings against plaintiff on some of the 
iHHUes. Tlw court made its own findings on remaining 
issues. of fact and law, and rendered judgrnent for plain-
tiff with an off set for a judgment in favor of defendant> 
on their counterelairn. 
RI<~LIKF' ROPCJ HT ON APPB~AL 
Defendants seek rever~al of the judgment granted 
to plaintiff against defendants. 
S1'ATEMF,NT' OF FAC1'S 
Plaintiff agrees with tnost of the facts stated in 
appellant's brief but adds the following statements con-
troverting or clarifying appellants' statement. 
The check of Heathfield F~quipment, Ltd. m the 
amount of $8,121.88 deposited by Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc. 
on July 28, 1966, (sometimes referred to as Check One) 
was charged-hack to the account on August 1, 1966, (Ex-
hibit D-17) and in accordance with the usual practice, 
notice thereoff was sent to Lundahls' accountants, but 
it was denied that the accountants or Lundahls had 
notice of the return of said check until after the monthly 
bank statement was recif•ved (1'r. 4~J. 50). Thereafter, 
the Bank collected from Lunclahls the amount of the 
overdraft created hy that eharge-baC'k. On the initial 
deposit of said item, it was not dPsignated as a "foreign 
ite1r1" Pven though it waR ctrawn on the Royal Bank of 
Canada, as a result of which it was returned with in-
structions to enter it for collection ( Exhihit D-17 and 
Tr. 449). ThP jury detPrrni1wd that tlw Bank was neg-
l!g-ent on that check when it failed to identify it as a 
foreign item, and further when it failed to notify Lun-
dalils about the overdraft caused by the loss of the first 
1·heek (Rec. 44). On this basis, judgment was entered 
on tile counterclaim against plaintiff in the amount of 
$8~rl.!l3. 
~uhsequentl>·, another check waa obtained from 
Jleatlifield Equipment, Ltd. in the amount of $8,100.00 
whieh was received November 15, 1966, but postdated 
bef'ause the money was not yet available (Exhibit P-4). 
The che('k was deposited December 5, 1966. with thP 
specific notation that it was for collection only (Ex-
hibits P-11 and P-3). A credit was givPn to the account 
of J<~zra C. Lundahl, Inc. with plaintiff Rank ( I,~xllihit 
P-:-n. T11is check is sometimes called Check Two. Said 
check was drawn on the Royal Bank of Canada, Kan-
loops. R.C. and by lPtter of December 9, 1966. said bank 
advi . .;ed plaintiff that thP check was dishonored for non-
suffi('ient funds but that tlw check would be held for 
pa:·111pnt unless otherwise irn;;tructed. The Bank sub-
sPqnPntl:· notified Lundahls of the dishonor of the check 
( Fin<ling No. 8 an<l 'rr. 21. 22), although the jury de-
h·n11ined that the noticP of dishonor was not given with-
in thP tirnP prescribed hy law (Rec. 44). This Second 
Ch<>ek is reall~· thf' onl>· issue on appeal. 
On F'ehrna r:· 1 :~. 1967, while the eheck wa.s still 
hPin_g IH·ld for eollPetion at the Ro:val Bank in Canada, 
l<~zra C. Lundahl, realizing that the <'.llP('k in ( 'anada 
had not )·et been paid. withdrew $7,000.00 from tl!f, 
<·orporate aeeount heeaw'<' lie didn't want tl1\• plaintin 
Bank "to glom onto" thP rnone)· (Tr. 20(), Exhibit t+ 
and Finding No. 12, Rec 71). Tl1e eh eek was tht>reaftPr 
returned unpaid and reeeivPd hy plaintiff Fehrnar:· Ju, 
1967 (Exhibit P-10). ·while the elH='<·k was pernling for 
collection, the Lundahls knew or should have kn01rn 
ofthefinaneiall.\· insolvent eondition of H<>athfield Eqllip-
ment, Ltd. and the unavailability of lllOJH:')" to pay the 
eheck rrr. 297 and Finding No. !), Rec. 69). Lundahl~ 
had requested the Bank to maintain tl1e cheek in Canada 
so that it could be paid \vhen funds were available for 
collection (Finding No. 9, ReC'. 70). Iim11ediatel)· upon 
receipt of the unpaid (']WC'k, plaintiff attempted to ('Oil 
tact the Lundahls and on F't'IJruar:· 17th, advised Cor-
dell Lundahl of the return of the C'heC'k err. 32). Tlw 
actual chage-back was entered on the next husim='ss da\·. 
l\fonday, February 20. 19G7 (Tr. :w and B~xhihit P-12) 
Oth(-•J" relavant l"ads an· ~-dnted in argument. 
J>OIXT I 
Tl1e plaintiff hank was t lit' agt•11t of the ensto111er 
Lundahl and granted a provisional nedit 011 Jk 
eernhcr ;), 19GG, whieh did not become final. 
POINT II 
A provisional credit is suhjPd to a <'ltargP-haek ll\ 
tliP d0positary hank if tliP d1Pck is dishonored Ill 
th" pa~·o1-. 
,\. The right to charge-back is not affected by 
prior use of funds available from the provis-
ional credit. 
H. An.v negligence of the bank is no bar to the 
hank's right of charge-hack. 
l'<JL\T III 
'L'h(' provision.:; of the commercial code covering 
hank collections do not apply in cases of unjust en-
riclnnent. 
l'Ofl\T TY 
The court did not preclude itself from making the 
fin al decision in the case, not only as to the law, 
hut as to facts not passed upon by the jury. 
POINTY 
The accord and satisfaction on January 4, 1967, 
did not include Check Two. 
ARGr:~fENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFF RANK 'VAS THE AGENT 
OF THE CUSTOMER LUNDAHL AND GRANTED 
A J>RO\TIRIONAL CREDIT ON DECEMBER 5, 1966, 
\\'HIC'll DID NOT RECOMI~ FINAL. 
l 'nder the Fniform Commercial Code. which has 
hPen in effect in the Rtate of Ptah for three years, the 
IPgal :'ltatus of hanks and other parties in hanking tran-
:-;aetions is clarified by the use of specific descriptive 
t<Tminolog>·· (Fnless otherwise specified herein, all 
statutor>· references are to Ptah Code Anno., 1953 as 
amended) Tn the ease at bar, First 8ecnrity Rank of 
() 
l'tah. N.A. occu1nes the position of "depositar.'· bank" 
hecause it is the first hank to which the $8,100.00 elit>('k 
in question was transferred for collection (Section 70,\ 
' 
4-105 (a)) .. This bank is also the "collecting bank" be-
cause it handled the item for collection (Section 70.\--l-
105 ( d)) and expected remittance in payment of the 
item from the "payor bank", the Royal Bank of Canada 
(Section 70A-4-10;) (b)). Appellant Ezra C. Lundahl, 
Inc. is the "customer" having the account with the 
Bank and for whom the Bank agreed to collect the itl-111 
(Section 70A-4-104 ( e)). Of eonsiderable initial im-
portance are the following provisions of Seetion 70A-
4-201 (1): 
( 1) l-nless a contrar~- intent elearl:·; ap1war:-: 
and prior to the ti11w that a settlement giwn h~· 
a collecting bank for an item is, or becomes final 
( suh-seetion ( 3) of seetion 70.A-4-211 and sedion:-; 
70A-4-212 and 70A-4-21:3) the hank is an a'!,·enf 
or suhagent of the owner of the item and nn~· 
settlement given for the itPm is provisional. Tliil' 
provision applies regardless of the form of in-
dor;.;ement or lark of irnlorsPment and even though 
eredit given for tlw itern is snhjeet to immediate 
withdrawel as of right or is in faet withdrawn: ... 
A prominent <·0111rne11tator ha:-: expressrrl it 
in this rnannPr: 
<'ollrding hank:-:. \\·l1Ptllf•r the first, strietl~­
an inten11edia1">· or the prPsPnting hank, arP ag-
ents of tl10 owner of an item Their responsihilit~ 
i:-; to aet in the customer':-; lwhalf: thev urnlertakl' 
no liahilit.'' as owners tliPmselves ( S;•etion 4-201 
( 1 ) ) . 
7 
A hank may become an owner where this is 
the clear intent of the parties and the endorse-
ment permits such ownership. See Section 4-201 
( 1 ) , ( 2). This is the exception and not the rule. 
Thus, risk of loss of the item and of bank in-
solvem·>· is on the owner and federal deposit in-
surance recovery is measured by his, not the 
eollecting bank's, rights. Bender's Uniform Com-
mercial Code Commentary, Vol. 4, Section 43.03. 
Respondent submits that by reason of the legal 
.-;tatus of the hank as the collecting agent for the cus-
tomer, any credit given to the customer's account is 
''provisional", or revocable if any final payment is 
not received. The right of the bank to charge-back a 
returned and unpaid item is made clear throughout 
the entire rniform Commercial Code, and indeed th-
roughout the common law in effect prior to adoption 
of the Code. Commercial requirements of the banking 
ronmrnnity dictate that a customer for whom collection 
is intended bears the risk of loss if the deposited item 
is returned unpaid b>· the pa:vor bank. Any loss from 
non-pa~·ment must be assumed hy the principal, not the 
agPnt This well-established concept of agency in the 
<'ontext ot' a banking transaction clearly supports re-
spondent's reasoning that the first credit given by the 
dPpositary hank to the customer is a pro1·isional credit. 
Tlw statute above cited requires such result. Being pro-
visional. the eredit is subject to a charge-back in the 
PYPnt the item is unpaid and is suhjeet to becoming 
~ 
final in the event tlie depositary bank re('eiV('S rP111ittan('e 
rn payment of the item. 
'rranslated into the fads of this case, it is ea~il>· 
disce.rned that the check of Heathfield J1~quiprnent, Ltd. 
dated DecPrnher 5, 1966, in the arnonnt of $R,100.00 ( J<:x-
hibit No. P-11) is the item which was deposited. 11hr 
reven;e side of that check quite rPgularly and unqnes-
tionably indicates by the ink starnperl endorsement of 
the Bank that it was "for colleetion on I:·". The deposit 
slip hearing the same date and referring to said item 
(Exhibit P-3) also states that it was for "eash eollP<'-
tion ". It is thus established that the hank was acting 
onl:· for and on behalf of its custornPr l1~zra C. Lundahl. 
Inc. in granting a provisional ('!'edit, with no liahilit~· 
for thP item otl1er than tlw responsihilit:· to use ordin-
ar:· earp (Section 70A-4-202). The provisional na turP 
of tl1P ('redit is furtl1er definP<l in tlw contract hetwPPll 
the parties (account signaturP card Exhibit P-1) wl1i(']1 
provides ;o;pecificall:· tliat tl1P Bank acts onl» as ag-ent 
for the customer witl1 tlw n•spon.sibility of exereising-
dm, care, and that all itPllls arP <'rPditPd suhjPd to final 
pavrnent in <·asl1 or solvent <·redit. 
The crPdit was not availahl<' for withdrawal as of 
right JwcansP tlw sPttle111<>nt liad not vet l>Pcome final 
(Section /OA-4-21:-1 ( .+)) K evertl1Plt>ss, the amount of 
the eredit was at least partiall.\ withdrawn on Febrnary 
1::3. 19fi7 (Tr. 20(i and 1~~xhihit 14). This faetnal strn<'-
9 
tun~ is eonsonant with those portions of Section 70A-
.f-201 providing far agency of the bank and a provis-
ional eredi t even though the credit "is in fact with-
<lra wn ". as well as being consonant with Section 70A-
.f-212 ( 4) (a) declaring that "The right to charge-back 
is not affected by (a) prior use of the credit given for 
the item;" .... Notwithstanding the clarity of the sta-
tutes and the smooth accommodation thereto of the facts 
of this case, Appellant has labored an argument to the 
pffeet that the provisional credit became final because 
of a delay on the part of the bank. No statutory pro-
r ision ur legal decision can be cited to support such 
position. Indeed, the Code sets forth the only conditions 
under which a provisional settlement may become final: 
Section 70A-4-213 ( 1) An item is finally 
paid by a payor hank when the bank has <lone 
an~- of thf' following, whichever happens first: 
(a) paid the item in cash; or 
( h) settled for the item without reserving 
a right to revoke the settlement ... :or 
( <') eornplPted thf' process of posting the 
item to the indicated account of the drawer, .. . ; or 
( <l) made a provisional settlement for the 
item and failed to revoke the settlement in the 
time and manner pf>rrnitted by statute, clear-
inghouse rulf' or agTeement. 
(2) If provisional settlement for an item 
between the presenting and payor hanks is made 
through a clearinghouse or b~- debits, or credits 
in an aceount hetwef'n thf'm, tlwn to tlw f'xtent 
I 0 
that prnvi::;ional delJit::; or credits for the itett1 
are entered in arcounts between the presenting-
and pa:-or hank:,; or between the presenting and 
successive prior collecting hanks seriatim, t litiy 
become final upon final payment of the item Ji~ 
the payor bank. 
03) If a collrctin9 bank recei1,es a settlement 
for an item which is or becomes final ( suhsee-
tion ( 3) of section 70A-4-211, subsection ( 2) of 
section 70A-4-213) the bank is accountable to it8 
customer for the amount of the item and any 
pro1:isio11al credit gi1·en for the item in an account 
/('ith its customer becom.es final. 
( 4) Subject to any right of the bank to apply 
the credit to an obligation of the customer, credit 
given h:- a hank for an item in an account with 
its cirntorner become:,; available for withdrawal 
as of right. 
(a) in any case wl1ere the bank has received 
a provisional settle1rn•nt for the item, - wlwn 
such settlement hecm11es final and the hank has 
had a reaf'onahle time to learn that the settle11wnt 
is final; 
(h) in an:- case where the bank is both o de-
positary bank and a payor bank and the item i:-
finally paid. - at the opening of the bank's se-
cond hanking day follffwinp: reeeipt of the item. 
(Emphasis added) 
rnder tlw facts of the ease at bar it cannot be 
denied that none> of the conditions spe('ified above as 
creating· a final settlement ha:,; ocenred. The consequen-
ces of the delay of the collecting bank, if any, do not 
give rise to any final settfrmP11t of a provisional cre<lit 
11 
for an item which is never paid! 
ln further support of the notion that the December 
5, 19titi check was not finally paid, the following com-
rnen ts are of interest: 
'' 'rhe concept of final payment is central 
to the scheme of Article 4 because the time of 
final payment of a check or similar item is the 
starting point for determining the rights and 
obligations of a number of parties in relation 
to an item. When final payment occurs, the pay-
or bank is deemed to be accountable to the pre-
senting party for the amount of the item. At 
the same time the drawer of the instrument is 
relieved of liability to the holder because the 
amount is deemed to have been paid. Ah;o, if the 
payor bank becomes insolvent and suspends pay-
ment once final payment has occured, the owner 
ol' an item will have a preferred claim against 
the payor bank for the amount. Final payment, 
lutherrnore, is one of the occurrences which can 
prevent the ''four legals'' - notice, stop-order, 
legal process and setoff - from heing effective 
to prevent actual payment of the item. Provis-
ional settlement, the credit given by the payor 
hank to the party presenting an item for collec-
tion, becomes final when final payment is made, 
as does credit for the item between the presen-
ting hank, other collerting hanks and the cus-
tomer seeking payment for the item. Final pay-
ment, moreover, marks the end of the collection 
process and thP beginning of the remitting pro-
cess, whereby the amount of the item is returned 
to the party demanding payment." (Note, Rank 
Procedures and the FCC - When iR a check 
final1y paid?, Roston Col1ege Tndnstrial Corn-
1 :2 
mercial Law Heview, \'olume TX, Nm11lwr 4, 
Page 9fi7 ) 
None of the legal consequences described in the 
above practical analysis of the effect of final settle-
ment ever existed in the transaction here involved. 
Lundahl simply has no basis whatever for asserting 
that the check was finally settled. 
An interesting judicial decision which supports 
respondent's position by analog:- is West Side Bank 
vs. Marine National E.rchange Bank, 37 Wis. 2d 661, 
155 N.\:V. 2d 587 (1968). There the court was concerned 
with the question of final settlement of the check by 
reason of the "completed posting" provision of Section 
4-213 (1) (c) and Section 4-109. The payor bank stamped 
the check "paid", charged the drawers account, photo-
graphed, cancelled and filed the item in the drawers 
account. Hours later, the drawer issued a stop-payment-
order after which the pa:'or hank withdrew the check 
from its files, reversed all the entries and returned 
the check to the collecting hank through the Clearing-
House. The collecting bank argued, of course, that 
the check' had been "paid" because of the final posting, 
and the return of the eheck was unwarranted. The court 
held that the pa_vor hank was not accountable for the 
item llecanse the process of posting was not complete 
until a derision was made that entries would not lw 
reversed or corrected, and this decision need not be 
made until the time to return an item has expired, i.e. 
l~ 
tl1t> midnight deadline of the next business day. 
Respondent herein believes that the liberality of 
the court in permitting return of an unpaid check, and 
the consequent rights of charge-back to the customer's 
account at the collecting bank, is an essential extention 
of the commercial requirements whereby collecting bank 
is merely on agent of the depositor and assumes no 
risk of loss. 
POINT II 
A PROVISION AL CREDIT IS SUBJECT TO A 
CHARGE-BACK BY THE DEPOSITARY BANK IF 
THE CHECK IS DISHONORED BY THE PAYOR. 
A. rrHE RIGHT TO CHARGE-BACK IS NOT 
AFFECTED BY PRIOR USE OF FUNDS 
AVAILABLE FROM THE PROVISIONAL 
CREDIT. 
Yiewed against the foregoing background of agency 
and provisional credits, the statutory right of charge-
back fits directly into the pattern. Section 70A-4-212 
provides in pertinent parti;: 
'' ( 1) If a collecting bank has made pro vis-
i onal settlement with its customer for an item 
and itself fails by reason of dishonor, suspem~ion 
of payments b?J a bank or otherwise to receive 
a settlement for the item which is or becomes 
final, the bank may revoke the settlement qiven 
by it, charge-back the amoimt of any cn'dit gitien 
for the item to its customer's account or obtain 
refund from its customer wheteher or not it is 
able to return the items if bv its midnight a~ad-
1-t 
line or within a longer rea::;onable time al'tior it 
learns the facts it returns the item or sends no-
tification of the facts. 'l1hese rights to revokP, 
charge-back and obtain refund terminate if and 
when a settlement for the item received hv the 
bank is or becomes final (subsection ( 3) of sec-
tion 70A-4-211 and subsections (2) and on of 
section 70A-4-213). 
( 4) Tl1e ri97it to charge-back is not affectfrl 
by 
(a) prior u:•e of th~ credit .r1in'.n for the item; 
or, 
(h) failure by an~· hank to exercise ordinary 
eare with respect to the item hut any hank so 
failing remains liahle." (Emphasis added) 
There is no question whatever that the hank made 
a provisional settlement on December 5, 1966, and that 
it failed by reason of dishonor to receive a final settle-
ment for the item from tlie payor bank (Finding No. 
7, Rec. 70). Therefore, the hank had the clear right to 
charge back to the customer's account the amount of 
credit previously given for the item when it was finally 
returned nnpaid in Fehruan·. 1967. 
Of critical importance to the issues before this court 
is the plain statuton· rnle that the right to charge back 
is not affected h~- prior use of the credit given for the 
itern or failure of the hank to Pxercise ordinary care 
with res1wd to the item. 'Vith regard to the last stated 
provision, it appears clear that the defendants claimed 
no damages with respect to the $8,100 00 of DecemhN 
l;) 
:>, 1966, a::; a re.sult of which no issue exists with respect 
thereto. We are left with two issues under the provisions 
of 70A-4-212: ( 1) The effect of the prior use of the 
credit given for the item by reason of the withdrawal 
by the Lundahls of $7 ,000.00 on February 13, 1967; 
and (2) failure of the bank to exercise ordinary care 
with respect to that particular item. 
:Much discussion is entertained in appellant's brief 
regarding the difference between the right of refund 
and the right of charge back. Respondent submits that 
all of such argument is meaningless under the proper 
interpretation of governing law as applied to the facts 
of this case. The very wording of Section 70A-4-212 ( 4) 
(a) grants the right of charge-back notwithstanding 
prior use of credit given for the item. Appellant Ezra 
C. Lundahl. Inc. made prior use of part of the credit 
givPn for the item by its withdrawal of $7,000.00 on 
February 13, 1967. Such use does not affect the Bank's 
right to charge-back the returned check one week later 
after it had received unpaid from the payor bank. Appel-
lant',;;: attempt to characterize this transaction as a "re-
fund'' has no real relevance to the case by reason of 
that :-;tatutory wording. 
Highlighting the distinction between "charge-back" 
and ''refund'' we bring to the court's attention the very 
definition of a "customer" which includes a person 
l1aving an account with a hank, as in the case here, as 
1() 
well as a penson "tor w horn a hank has agreed to collPi:>t 
items" (Section 70A-4-10-1- (1) ( e)). A hank seeking 
a refund against a customer would include a bank whieh 
cashed a check or otherwise extended credit for a collec-
tion item to someone not utilizing an account with the 
hank, but who is a "customer" nevertheless because 
the Lank agreed to effect collection of the item for him. 
T n such case, the bank would clearly have no right to 
charge-back a returned item to any account. This is 
distinguishable from the case at bar where the defen-
dant Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc. maintained an account and 
the right of charge-back was not affected by the fact 
that a substantial portion of the money was withdrawn 
from the account prior to the date of charge-back. The 
overdraft thus created ·which forms the basis of plain-
tiff's complaint is still a very different kind of transac-
tion than obtaining a refund from a non-account-holding 
'' custo111er'' who utilized no account which might be 
subject to the charge-hack. This Court will not be con-
fused by appellant's attempt to complicate a statutory 
provision which is simple in the wording of Section 
70.-\-4-212 (4) (a). 
Tli<> following e011m1ents from Anderson's P niforrn 
C01rn11erC'ial Code, Yolurne 2, rna:< he helpfuJ. 
The right to eharge-hack or obtain a refund 
from its custolller is a emnulative or additional 
remedy of the eollecting bank. The fact that it 
fails to exen·is0 snrh right, or fails to do so 
within the time reqnirt><l hy tlw rode, is imrna-
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terial with respect to and does not affect any 
other right which it has against the customer 
or any other person. (Anderson, Section 4-212 :3) 
'11he right of the collecting bank to charge 
back is not affected by the circumstances that 
the customer has made a prior use of the credit 
given for the item. Nor is it affected by the fact 
any bank in the chain of collection, including 
even the depositary bank, failed to exercise ord-
inary care with respect fo the item. Conversely, 
any bank which has been negligent remains lia-
ble for its negligence and such liability is not 
affected by the existence of the right of charge-
hack. 
When a customer's bank has permitted the 
customer to withdraw the amount of the credit 
given for a deposited check, the bank may charge 
hack against the depositor's account the amoant 
of such check if because of the drawer's stopping 
payment thereof, the customer's bank is not able 
to collect the eheck. Pazol 11. Citizens Nati< 1nal 
Bank, 110 Ga. App. 319, 138 S.E. 2d 442. t' An-
derson, Section 4-212 :5) 
B. ANY NEGLIGENCE OF THE BANK IS NO 
BAR TO THE BANK'S RIGHT OF CHAR-
GF,-BACK. 
In response to the Court's special interrog-atories 
which rovered some of the issues in the case, the jury 
detPrmined that the Bank was negligent in not notifying 
Lundahl of the nonpayment of the December 5th check 
in the time prescribed hy law (Rec. 44). Reference is 
made to Exhibit P-6 wherein the Royal Bank of Canada 
;;pecifieall~' advised First Serurity Bank that the rheck 
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would continue to lw held for JH:t)rrnent. H iR also clearh 
made a finding that the Hank did keep the Lundahl~ 
advised of the status of the check at the Royal Bank 
of Canada and of it:< nonpayment (Findings No. 8). 
'T'he latter finding is ampl)· supported by evidence. An 
officer of the Bank testified of numerous occasions 
in which the status of the unpaid check was discnssed 
with the Lundahls (Tr. 21, 22). 
In the appellant's brief it is claimed that the lower 
court did not understand the impact of its findings, 
for a contradiction in terms is claimed. Apparently, 
the argument is that because the jury found that the 
Bank did not give notice of the dishonor of the check 
on December 9th when gxhibit P-6 was received. or 
within tht> midnight deadline thereafter, then any fur-
ther notice given by the Bank should not be counted. 
8ueh an argument is clearl>· untenable. Section 70A-4-
212 (-!-) (b) clearl)· states that the right to chage-hack 
is not aff eeted by failure of the hank to exercise ord-
inary care, In Comment 5 to the section from the 1962 
official text of the National Conference of Commission-
er::-; on lTniforrn State Law::-;, we quote: 
";). ThP rule of :,;nh:,;edion ( 4) relating to 
charge-haek (as disti.nguisliPd from claim for 
refnncl) appliPs i nespPdive of the cause of the 
nm1pn>·111ent, and of tile person ultimately liable 
for nonpay1rn•nt. Thus, eharge-baek is permitted 
even \d1ere nonpa>·rnent results from the de-
positar» hank':.; own lH',!.digenee. ,\n>· other rnl0 
U) 
would re~;ult in litigation based upon a crnm1 
for wrongful dishonor of other checks of the 
('Ustorner, with potential damages far in exces.s 
of the amount of the item. An~' other rule would 
require a hank to determine difficult questions 
of fact. The customer's protection is found in 
the general obligation of good faith (Sections 
1-203 and 4-103). If bad faith is established the 
customer's recovery "includes other damages, if 
any, suffrred by the party as a proximate con-
sequence" (Rection 4-103 (;)): see also Section 
4-402)." 
Respondent submits that the lower court's findings 
herein that the Bank kept Lundahl fully informed as 
to the status of the check goes directly to the question 
of ''good faith'' of the Bank. The customer is protected 
in the right of charge-hack notwithstanding negligence 
of the h:mk because the hank is still the agent of the 
customer and if the hank acts in good faith, it has the 
unconditional riglit to eharge-back an unpaid check, 
and thus reverse tl1e proYisional credit Indeed, the 
µ:ood faith of the customer is hroug-ht into question 
wh<>n the eourt specificall~' coneluded that "the cus-
tomer kne\Y or should have known that the drawer of 
the check was in unsound financial straits and either 
insolyent or on the verge of insolvency." (Rec. 73, Con-
dusion No. 2). We also observe that the testimony of 
~Ir. Heathfield to the effect that the Bank could have 
paid the check in question is totally meaningless in 
\'iPw of the fart that the Royal Bank of Canada held 
tl1P rlwck for the specific purpose of obtaining na~'-
'..?O 
rnent thereon, and after the check was returned unpaid 
by letter of Februar>' 10, 1967, (Exhibit P-10) the Royal 
Bank subsequently explained that Heathfield was 111 
no financial condition to pay the check at any Erne dm-
ing the period it had been held (Exhibit P-28). 
At Page 41 of appellant's brief, the case of Rock 
Island Auction Sales Inc. vs. Empire Packing Company, 
32 Ill. 2d 269~ 204 N.:BJ. 2d 721, 18 ALR 3d 1368 (1963) 
is discussed, but appellant misconstrues the impact of 
that decision. In that case, the PWlJOr bank held a check 
beyond its midnight deadline because its depositor, the 
drawer of the check, assured the bank that funds would 
be deposited to cover the item Such is precisely the 
case here with the Royal Bank of Canada. The Illinois 
Supreme Court, however, specifically stated that the 
collecting bank is in a different legal status: 
" .... Depositar~· and collecting banks art 
primarily as conduits. '1'he steps that they take 
can only indir0ctly affect the determination of 
whether or not a check is to be paid, which is the 
focal point in the collection process. 'rhe legisla-
hue could haYe eoncluded that the failure ol' 
such a bank to meet its deadline would most fre-
quently be the resnlt of negligence, and fixed 
liabilit>- accordingly. TliP rolP of a payor hank 
in tl1P rnflprtio11 J!rocess, on fhf other hand. ;, 
crvrial. It knmrs ll'hetlier or not the drawer has 
funds arailah!P to pa11 flip item. 'rhe legislature 
could have considered tl1at the failure of s11cl1 
a hank to meet its dea<lline is likel>· to be <lue 
to fartors other tlian neg-ligence, and that the 
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relationship between a payor hank and it::; cus-
tomer may so influence its conduct as to cause 
a conscious disregard of its statutory duty. 'rhe 
pn·sent ease is illustrative. The defendant, in 
its position as a payor bank, deliberately aligned 
itself with its customer in order to protect that 
eustorner's credit and consciously disregarded 
tlw dnt.'· imposed upon it " (Emphasis added) 
We are not concerned in this action, unfortunately, 
with a elaim for relief against the Royal Bank of Can-
ada. 'rliat hank's action was crucial. First Security 
Hank, on the other hand, acted in good faith and did 
not take or omit any action which was detrimental to 
tlw interests of Lundahl. 
B.'' reason of all of the foregoing considerations, 
n•sporn!ent Bank herein was clearly entitled to charge-
haC'k tl1e returned item of $8,100.00 in February, 1967, 
and to recover from Lundahl the amount of the over-
draft neated thereh.''· 
POIN'r TTI 
TH~~ PROVISIONR OF THE COMMERCIAL 
CODI-<~ COVERING BANK COLLECTIONS DO NOT 
A PPPLY lN CASER OF FN.TFST ENRICHMENT. 
ARGFl\fENT 
The lower court made a specifiC' finding- that Lun-
<lnlil had been and would continue in the future to be 
m1ju..;tl.'' enriched unless compelled to make repayment 
to tl1P hank on the $8,100.00 C'heck for which it had re-
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ceived credit from Plaintiff and used the rnonev there-
from, but which check was never honored or paid h> 
either the drawee or drawer. (Finding of Fact 11) 
In other words, if Lundahl were allowed to keep the 
full $8,J 00.00 which Plaintiff had kindly advanced 
to Lundahl on the basis of the anticipated collection 
of the $8,100.00 check, but which in fact was nc~ver 
collected, Lundahl would be unjustly enriched at the 
expense of Plaintiff, who had come to Lundahl's aid 
and assistance. 
Based on this finding, the lower court concluded 
that the provisions of the Commercial Code are not 
applicable where the bank customer solicits the aid 
and assistance of the bank in securing and collecting 
a post-dated replacement check issued to cover a prior 
lost check, where the customer knew or should have 
known that the issuer of the check was in unsound 
financial straits and either insolvent or on the verge 
of insolvenc:·. (Conclusion of Law 2, R. 73) 
'rhe Commercial Code recognizes situations where 
the technical provisions of the Code should not apply. 
Section 70A-4-212, UCA, 1953 Replacement, Right of 
Charge-back or Refund, Suhsection ( 5) provides: 
" ( 5) A failure to charge-hack or claim re-
fund does not affect other rights of the bank 
agaim;t the customer or any other party.'' 
This iR all in accord with the basic. fundamental 
rule of Restitution: 
2·> d 
American Law Institute, Restatement of the 
Law, Restitution: 
"Section 1. Unjust Enrichment. 
A pernon who has been unjustly enriched 
at the expense of another is required to make 
restitution to the other." 
''Comment: 
a. A penson is enriched if he has received 
a benefit (see Comment b). A person is unjustly 
enriched if the retention of the benefit would be 
nnjust. A person obtains restitution when he 
i~ restored to the position he formerly occupied 
either by the return of something which he form-
erly had or by the receipt of its equivalent in 
mone?. Ordinarily, the measure of restitution is 
1he amount of enrichment received, hut as stated 
in Comment e, if the loss suffered differs from 
tl1e amount of benefit received, the measure of 
restitution may be more or less than the loss 
:-:nffered or more or less than the enrfrlnncnt. 
h. vVhat ronstitutes a benefit . . \ '>rrson ron-
fers a benefit upon another if hf' gives to the 
other possession of or some other intere:-;t in 
111one>-, land, chattel~. or ehoses in aetion, per-
forms :-;ervice:-; henefi.eial to or at the request of 
the other, or in any wa>- adds to the other's se-
curit>- or advantage He confers a benefit not onl.11 
u·here lie adds to the property of another, but 
also u 1hPre he sa1 1es flu? other from P.r:pense or 
loss. The word "benefit" therefore. denotes any 
form of advantage. The advantag-e for which a 
person ordinarily rnu:-;t pa~r is pernnian- advjin-
tage: it is not, however, neres:-;arih- so limited, 
as where a physician attends an insensible ner-
:-:on wl10 is save<l snhseqnent pnin or ·who receives 
2-t 
thereby a greater chance of living.'' 
Section -1. Remedies : 
In situations in which a person i8 entitlPd 
to restitution, he is entitled, in an appropriatp 
case, to one or more of the following remedies: 
(a) * * * (e) 
( f) a judgement at law or decree in equit)· 
for the payment of money, directly or b~r wa~ 
of set-off or counterclaim. 
Section fl. Forms of Action. 
'rhe appropriate proceedings in an action 
at law for the payment of money by way of res-
titution is: 
(a) * * * (h) 
( c) in States whirh have statutes providing 
for the abolition of the distinctions between forms 
of action, an action in which the facts entitling 
the Plaintiff to re.;;titntion are set forth. 
The facts of this case support the Court's Finding 
and Conclusion. A chronicle of the pertinent facts are: 
l. Cheek one was Jost through no fault of the Plain-
tiff hank, hut either in transit or by Lundahl 's agent. 
(Finding of Fact 3, R. 74, and jury's Answer to Special 
Interrogatory 2, R. 44) which recognizes the loss of 
check one, hut makes no finding of negligence against 
the hank regarding said loss, thus accepting the bank's 
evidence showing a tramanittal of the check one to Lun-
dahl 's agent 'rr. 241-246) 
2. A most difficult time was had h>· the Lnndahls 
m ;-;p<·unng a replacement check from Heathfield, and 
tltP hank, at I ,undahl 's request, aided materially in se-
curing the Check Two in place of Check One. (Findings 
or f<'aet 4 and ;J, 1'r. 234-235, and Ex. 18, Letter Bank 
to HPathfield, I<~x. 25 Letter Heathfield to Bank.) 
i1. Check rl1wo, when finally issued by Heathfield 
to rowr lost Check One, was postdated. (Findings 
of Faet 5, R. 69, Ex. 4 Letter of Transmittal from 
H rathfield to Lundahl explaining reason for post-dat-
ing and Lundahl 's prior knowledge of circumstances.) 
4. That during this time and continuing on for the 
duration of time herein involved, Heathfield was in 
unsound financial condition and its checking account 
snh<·et to almost continuous overdraft. That Lundahl 
knew of this, or should have been well aware of this. 
(Findings of Fad ;) ; l~~x. 25, which is Heath field's bank 
statements for the year 1966: Ex. 4, 6, 7, 8, 9. 10, and 25, 
wliieh are all letters; Tr. 158 to 185, inc. the testimony 
or HaJ'\'P\' C'. Heathfield 
;l. That between the date, to-wit: Fehruar_'I· 10, 1967 
( l 1~x. 10) when the Royal Bank of Canada returned 
('lt('C'k Two to Plaintiff, and its receipt by Plaintiff on 
F'ei>ruar_'I· rn, 1967, (Tr. 31), Lundahl withdrew the 
,;nm of $7,000.00 from its aceount. (Finding of f:i'act 
I'.!: Tr. 217-218, 1'r. 222-223) In the depo.-;ition of F~zra 
C. Lundahl he refused to answer wh_\' said withdrawal 
\\ ns made, then in answer to written interrogatories 
:2(; 
he gave one rem;on for withdrawing tlte money, and 
during testimony at the trial he gave other reasons. 
(Findings of Fact 13; Tr. 217-218, Tr. 222-22:1). The 
lower Court made a Finding (~umber 13) that sair! 
withdrawal was not made in good faith. 
6. 1"1hat notwithstanding the assertion of Harvey 
G. Heathfield that Heathfield had a continuing line of 
credit up to $60,000.00 with the Royal Bank of Canada, 
for some unexplained reason the Royal Bank of Canada 
did not honor the Second Check even though it held 
po3session of said unpaid check for over two months, 
thus contributing to the overall picture of bad faith 
dealings or arrangements between Lundahls, Heath-
fields, and Heathfield's hank. (Tr. 172-178, 181-182). 
7. ~rhat the withdrawal of $7,000.00 by Ezra Lun-
dahl from the Corporate account on February 13, !967 
was made just a few da:n; before Check Two was re-
turned unpaid leaving insufficient funds in the account 
to cover the check when it returned and at a time when 
Cordell Lundahl was in Canada and had discussed the 
second check with ~~zra Lundahl, all the while pro-
fpssinµ: to know nothing about H eathfield 's inabilit~· 
to pay it. 
Based on the ahovP law and farts. the lower eourt 
determined that the technical rnles governing bank 
collections were not applieable .. \nd to prevent an unjust 
enrichment in favor of Lundahl, ,,·ho aeted in had faith. 
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at the exµen:::;e of the Plaintiff bank, who went out of 
its way to assist its customer's attempt to get out of 
a sticky matter, only to have the customer turn on the 
bank and attempt to "stick" it for the $8,000.00, the 
Court allowed Plaintiff to recover its out-of-pocket 
(·x1ienditure made to benefit the customer. 
rrlie Court ruled that the Plaintiff bank was en-
titled to recover the $8,100.00 it had advanced to Lun-
dahl, less only what it had recouped on the charge-back, 
IPss damages as fixed by the jury for its negligence. 
In all other respects, the Plaintiff bank gave timely 
notice and kept Lundahl fully advised in all respects. 
(Findings of Fact 8) 
On this theory of restitution alone, to prevent un-
just enrichment, Plaintiff is entitled to an affinnance 
of the lower courts decision. 
POINT IV 
BY srBl\II11TING A SPECIAL YF~RDICT AND 
lNTl~JRROGATORIB~S TO THE JURY, THE COERT 
D fD NOT PRE CL UDE ITSELF FROM MAKING 
'l'Hf1J F1NAL DECISION IN THE CASE. NOT ONLY 
AN TO THE LAW, BUT AS TO FACTS NOT PASS-
l1:n 1 'PON BY THE SPRY. 
A RO rMEN'l1 
Appellant takes the position that the Court, having 
snlnnitted the case to the jur~· upon a 8pecial verdict 
and interrogatories was thereafter precluded from fur-
ther participation in the case. Appellant argues that 
the jury having an.swered four questions, this disposed 
of the lawsuit and that the Court had nothing further 
to do but render a general verdict for Defendants. 
'rhis view of appellants is not in accord with Rule 
49, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Special Verdicts 
and Interrogatories. 
Rule 49 reads: 
RULE 49 
SPECIAL YERDICTS AND 1N'L1ERROGATORIES 
(a) Special Verdicts: rrhe court may require 
a jury to return only a special verdict in the 
form of a special written finding upon each issue 
of fact. In the event the Court may submit to 
the jury written interrogatories susceptible of 
('ategorical or other brief answers or may sub-
mit written forms of several special findings 
which might properl)- he made under the plead-
ings and evidence: or it may use such other meth-
od of submitting the issues and requiring the 
written findings thereon as it deems most appro-
priate. The court shall give to the jury such ex-
planation and instruction eoncerning the matter 
thus submitted as ma~- he necessary to enable 
the jur.v to make its findings upon each issue. 
If in so doing the Court omits any issue of fact 
raised by the pleadings or hy the evidence, eacl1 
part.\- waives his right to a trial h~- j1u)- of the 
issue so omitted unless before the jury retires 
he demands its submission to the jury. As to an 
issue omitted without such demand the Court 
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may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it 
shall h<:> deemed to have made a finding in aecord 
with the judgment on the special verdict. 
R.v the plain terms of this Rule, each party waives 
his right to a jury trial on any issue of fact not sub-
mitted to the jury. And, as to issue omitted, the Court 
ma)· make a finding. 
rl'hP Court has control of the case during the trial. 
Hanks vs. Christensen, (1960) 11 U. (2d) 8, 354 P(2d) 
;)G4. In exercising this control, the Court may submit 
the case to 1:1- jury upon: (1) a general verdict; (2) a 
-:pecial verdict or interrogatories; or (3) a combinatio;n 
of interrogatories with a general verdict. Here, the 
Court rhose method (2). 
'' '11he function of the special verdict is to 
secure a findings from the jury upon each ques-
tion of ultimate fact litigated as distinguished 
from a gene.ral verdict by which the jury find~ 
upon all the issues '' Hughes Federal Practice, 
.J nrisdiction and Procedure, Vol. 18. Section 24302. 
page 319. 
rtali Rule 49 (a) is modeled from Federal Rule 
-Hl (a). 
;\nd. at this point, it is well to emphasis a factor 
tliat appellant insists on ignoring, which is that in 
:-;ptting out in detail, in answer to question 2 submitted 
to the jury. just how and in what respects Plaintiff-
Hespondant was negligent, the jury was likewise making 
a finding as to no negligence and a proper performance 
:m 
on the .part of plaintiff-bank m handling the nrnltiplt> 
transactions it was rPquPsted to assist defendant-appt>l 
lant with in this matter. 
An example of this 1s Defendant-Appellant's in-
sistence on claiming, notwithstanding there was no find-
ing by the jury in their favor on this, that the Plain-
tiff-Respondent lost the first check, did not give notice 
to Defendant-Appellant of the charge-back on it and 
did not return the check to them. rrhe record is extrem- ' 
ely clear on the procedure followed by the bank in re-
turning this check (check one) to Lundahl 's agent and 
that the agent receiYed it ,(Tr. 241-246, 256-261, 2el-
262), and obviously both the Court and the jury elected 
to believe this evidence. The jury detailed no finding 
of negligence in this respect and the Court specifically 
found that check one was either lost in transit rifter 
being mailed out, together with a charge-back slip, by 
the hank, or lost after receipt by Lundahl 's agent. In 
either event. this was no fault of the bank, nor a result 
of its failure to act properly. 
Quoting further from Hugh es, Y ol. 18, Section 
24302, page 320: 
'' Bv submission of a special verdict it is 
('Ontemplated that the jrn·~- he required to answer 
the questions submitted to them upon the evi-
dence and in accordance with the instructions 
of the Court. It is no part of the jury's function 
to determine what effect its answers will 11ave 
upon the final outcome of the trial." 
~1 
In summary. what the Court did here was to ask 
tlw jur.v to answer four questions concerning fa<:>tual 
mattPrs. 'T'rw Court did not, nor did the parties, re-
que:-;t a general verdict from the jury. This left the 
ultimate decision in the case, together with determin-
ation of all factual issues not submitted to the jury, 
up to the Court. Actually the Court spelled this out 
in submitting the interrogatories to the jury, by telling 
them that the Court was going to make the ultimate 
derision on the Plaintiff's case and the question of the 
guarantee. (Tr. 220, 267-268) 
And the Court further spelled out at that time that 
there were other questions he could submit to the jury, 
hut chose not to. (Tr. 268) 
In sl1ort, the Court followed the proper procedure 
m making its own findings on omitted issues, and in 
applying the law correctl:v to all of the facts as found 
h.v the jury Court. That the Court committed no error 
in its decision is shown in other phases of this brief. 
POINT V 
THg ACCORD AND SATISFACTION ON JAN-
l'ARY +, 1967, DID NO'T' INCLFDE CHECK T\VO. 
ARGTTM~~N'T' 
The trial court submitted the question of an accord 
and sati;;;faction between Plaintiff-Respondant and De-
t'Pn<lant-A ppellant as of .January 4, 1967, to the jury. 
The jury found an accord and satisfaction a:s of 
that date, which finding the Court approved and ac-
cepted. Finding of Fact 1 f'l and 16, and Conclusion ol' 
Law l. 
The Court found, however, that said accord and 
satisfaction made on January 4, 1967, did not include 
Check Two, and rightly so. Check Two was not even 
returned unpaid to the Plaintiff bank until long after : 
January 4, 1967, to-wit: on February 16, 1967. 
Prior to January 4, 1967, all concerned considered 
that Check rrwo would be paid (Tr. 57), and Hesston 
Corporation, who entering into a contract (Ex. D-19) 
with Lundahl which provided for the payment of Lun-
dahl 's obligation, was so informed. (Tr. 77-79) 
It was not until after .Jan nary 4, 1967, and actuall)' 
m "B-,ehruary, on or about the 9th or 10th thereof, that 
it became apparent that Check Two would not be paid. 
It is difficult to see how an accord and satisfaction 
ns of one date would cover a liability that was not 
made known until a later date. Actually, if Defendants-
AppP.llants arguement in this respect is accepted, i.e.: 
That Hesston contract applied not only to the items 
listed on Exhibits 21 and 23, to-wit: the notes 
and contracts then outstanding, hut settled everything-
hetween the hank and Lundahl, then it would apply to 
the bank accounts held by the Lundahls at that time 
with the hank 'vherein a dehtor-ereditor relatiom:hip 
')') 
t)t) 
existed, and the bank would be entitled to claim an 
amount from the Lundahls totaling the sum of all mon-
P)'S in deposit on said day. The Court excepted the day-
to-<la>· bank accounts from the accord and satisfaction 
(Conclusion of Law 1) and Lundahl does not quarrel 
with this exception, they only want to quarrel with 
the exception which hurts them and leave standing the 
exception which helps them. 
''Accord and satisfaction is a method of dia-
charging a contract or cause of action, whereby 
the parties agree to give and accept something 
in settlement of the claim or demand of the one 
a1~ainst the other, and perform such agreement, 
the ''accord'' being the agreement and the ''sat-
isfaction" is execution or performance." Fair 
cl1ild vs. Mathews (Idaho, 1966) 41!5 P (2d) 43. 
In Fairchild, the Idaho Supreme Court went 
on to say: (Page 46 of 415 P (2d) 
"1~0 constitute an accord and aatisfaction 
there must be an offer in full satisfaction of the 
obligation accompanied by such acts and declar-
a tiorn~ as amount to a condition that if it is ac-
cepted, it is to he in full satisfaction, and the con-
dition must he such that the party to whom the 
offer is made is bound to understand that if he 
accepts it, he does so snhject to the conditions 
inq1osed. '' 
And further on, at the sanw page: 
''In order for the acceptance of a check to 
amount to an accord and satisfaction. where it 
is for a lesser sum that is claimed b>· the creditor 
to be due, the conditions must hr made plain, 
drfinitr and certain h~· the <lehtor that he i3 
:)-± 
g1vmg such che('k in complete settlement anJ 
satisfaction of all accounts between him and his 
creditor and that acceptance thereof shall clo1'e 
the account or tontroversey. Also an accord and 
satisfaction cannot arise by reason of the pay-
ment of less than is due, unless it clearly appear~ 
not only that this was the intention of the payor, 
but also that the payee expressly agreed to it. 
or was bound to know of the intention at the 
time of the acceptance; in effect, that his taking 
of a check would be tortious except upon the 
assumption of a taking in full satisfaction. It 
eannot he too strongly stated that an accord and 
satisfaction can never he implied from language 
of doubtful meaning; indeed. the words them-
selves deny this pos8ibility. Hence, where a suh-
stantial doubt arises, there can be no such appli-
cation, the usual rule applies, and the payment 
will be treated as on account only." 
Applying this law to the existing facts, it certain-
ly appears that the accord and satisfaction of ,Januar>' 
4, 1967 did not and co1.tld not include the Second Check. 
Lundahl in one hreath says that the amount of 
money paid hy them to the hank on January 4, 1967. 
pursuant to the Hesston agreement and Exhibit 21 and 
23 discharged their liabilit!- to the bank under Check 
'rwo. which was not even mentioned in either of said 
F.xhibits, and in the second breath maintain to thi:; 
very date that the!- had no knowledge of the Second 
Check being unpaid nntil Fehrnan· 10, 1967. 
Ohvionsl!-, the two positions are inconsistent, and 
m fact, mntuall~- exclnsin~. 
If they made payment of money to the bank on 
.January 4) 1D67, in discharge of Check Two, knowledge 
of Cheek 1'wo and a "plain, definite and certain" offer 
to discharg-e it would be an essential element to include 
it in the accord and satisfaction. 
1t is impossible to reconcile Lundahl 's position m 
this respect. 
The Court's Findings and Conclusions hased on 
the record and the .Judgment entered thereon should 
he upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The plain simple facts are that Lundahl wants to 
keep thP bank's money. The lower Court refused to 
lend its aid to such an unjust enrichment. Respondent 
earnest!.'- requests this Court to do likewise, and up-
hold the trial Courts Findings, Conclusions and .J udg-
rnent. 
Respeetfull.'- Submitted. 
Olson and Hoggan 
By 
Ray, Quinne.'· and N eheker 
B.'· ------------------------------------------------------------
Attorne.'·s for Plaintiff-Respondent 
